We provide the first quantitative analysis of political regime type and warfare in the pre-modern era. We show that early parliamentary regimes -the institutional predecessors of modern democracies -were disproportionately more likely to experience armed conflict than their absolutist counterparts. By way of empirical evidence, we examine a new database of interstate conflict and political regime type for all sovereign polities in Europe between 1200 and 1800. We employ two complementary empirical strategies: a traditional dyadic analysis of conflict initiation, and a dynamic network analysis that accounts for interdependence between dyads. Our analyses show that early parliamentary regimes fought significantly more than nonparliamentary regimes, both overall and against each other. These regimes, we argue, had a relatively large capacity to make war, but -unlike modern democracies -not enough constraints to reduce its frequency.
Introduction
The absence of war between institutionally mature democracies is one of the most well-established results in international relations, coming "as close as anything we have to an empirical law" (Levy, 1988, p. 88) . Modern democracies hardly ever go to war against each other (Maoz and Russett, 1993 , Dixon, 1994 , Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013 , although they do sometimes engage in conflict with non-democracies Russett, 1997, Bueno de Mesquita et al., 1999) . Almost all empirical evidence for the democratic peace comes from wars fought after the Congress of Vienna in 1815, and for good reason. Modern democracies were virtually non-existent before this date, and remained rare for another hundred years (Marshall, Gurr and Jaggers, 2013 ). Yet, even before 1800, states with more representative and accountable political institutions did exist (Stasavage, 2010, van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker, 2012) . We know little about the consequences of such institutions for armed conflict, and whether the contemporary democratic peace is a wholly new phenomenon or a continuation of previous historical trends. This paper finds that, historically, the relationship between war and political regime type was very different from what it is today. The modern democratic peace followed centuries of warfare between early parliamentary regimes -the institutional predecessors to modern democracies. Using new data on interstate conflict in late medieval and early modern (henceforth "pre-modern") Europe between 1200 and 1800, we show that parliamentary regimes were much more likely to go to war -against both each other and absolutist regimes -than non-parliamentary regimes. During this long period, parliamentary regimes represented just a quarter of sovereign polities in Europe, but fought in nearly 80 percent of all wars. We establish these patterns through two parallel, but complimentary, empirical strategies: (1) a traditional dyadic analysis of interstate conflict, and (2) temporal exponential random graph models, which account for the multilateral, interdependent nature of war. We also show that our results are robust to a wide range of potential confounders. To the best of our knowledge, our paper offers the first systematic evaluation of political regime type and armed conflict over such a long stretch of history.
In Europe -the same world region where evidence for the modern democratic peace is most abundant -warfare was a ubiquitous historical feature of international relations (Hoffman, 2015, pp. 21-3) . Parker (1996, p. 1) states: "Hardly a decade can be found before 1815 in which at least one battle did not take place." Similarly, Tilly (1992, p. 72) argues that major European powers were at war in more than 90 percent of all years over the 1500s and 1600s and nearly 80 percent of all years over the 1700s. One explanation for this frequent warfare is the general absence of democracy. Absolutist monarchs could spark armed conflicts on their whims, treating warfare like a "royal sport" (Hale, 1985, p. 29-30) . Another explanation, which we develop here, is that warfare emerged not from unfettered absolutism, but from more representative and accountable political institutions. To help finance warfare, monarchs exchanged (partial) political representation for new fiscal resources (Bates, 2010, pp. 56) . As the fiscal and military strength of parliamentary regimes grew, however, the institutional constraints on the ruler's war-making ability did not generally keep pace. The result was a pattern of war participation opposite of what one would expect today: more representative and accountable governments regularly went to war, while absolutist governments were relatively peaceful.
Our results might appear to challenge theories of the modern democratic peace, since states with more representative and accountable political institutions were significantly more likely to experience armed conflict before 1800. Yet early parliamentary regimes were not "democratic." In a macro-historical sense, they were "transitional" autocratic regimes, with a relatively large capacity to wage war, but too few institutional constraints to reduce its frequency. How pre-modern parliamentary belligerence evolved into the contemporary democratic peace is an important puzzle that future international relations research will need to address.
Regime Type and Warfare in Pre-Modern Europe
Pre-modern European states generally adhered to one of two models of domestic political organization. The first was absolute monarchy, in which the head of state was not formally accountable to any political authority other than himself, and royal political power was not subject to constitutional restrictions or institutionalized power sharing.
The second model was a parliamentary system, in which monarchs (partially) shared formal political authority -particularly over taxation -with a representative assembly.
"Absolutist Monarchs Caused War"
Drawing on the absolutist model, scholars sometimes characterize warfare in premodern Europe as the "sport of kings" (e.g., Hale, 1985, pp. 29-30) . This view holds that absolutist monarchs faced few formal constraints and paid few political penalties for reckless foreign policies, thereby increasing the odds that they would rush headlong into conflict. According to Thomas More's sixteenth-century Utopia, for example, commoners thought that "they will be driven and enforced to war against their wills by the furious madness of their princes and heads" (More, 1999, p. 180) . Indeed, the "royal sport" view is consistent with what one might expect if the logic of the contemporary democratic peace extended back to the pre-modern era. Personal ambitions, combined with a lack of domestic constraints, may increase the likelihood that modern dictators will engage in "belligerence and incautious behavior" (Weeks, 2014, p. 86) .
"Parliamentary Governments Caused War"
Scholarship on pre-modern parliaments emphasizes consent by representative assemblies in fiscal matters above all else (e.g., Stasavage, 2010, pp. 627-8) . Representative assemblies did not necessarily represent the interests of the public, but those of wealthy taxpayers -namely the clergy, nobility, and merchants (Marongiu, 1968, p. 31) . These parliaments acted in a formal consultative role and typically held control over taxation and, in relatively rare cases, over spending (Stasavage, 2010, pp. 630-1) . Their ability to restrain executive authority in decisions of war was therefore limited. Rather, by increasing state fiscal capacity, parliaments actually enhanced the state's ability to make war.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, absolutist monarchs were often fiscally beholden to a wide variety of entrenched regional interests, reducing their ability to accumulate resources (Epstein, 2000, pp. 13-15) . One way to secure new funds was through a parliamentary bargain, whereby a ruler exchanged (partial) political representation for new tax payments (e.g., Bates, 2010, pp. 56) . Tilly (1994, p. 24) describes this process as follows:
Why, despite obvious interests to the contrary, did rulers frequently accept the establishment of institutions representing the major classes within their jurisdictions? In fact, those institutions were the price and outcome of bargaining with different members of the subject population for the wherewithal of state activity, especially the means of war. Kings of England did not want a parliament to form and assume ever-greater power; they conceded power to barons and then to clergy, gentry, and bourgeois in the course of persuading them to raise the money for warfare.
Indeed, scholars highlight the relationship between warfare and the establishment of representative assemblies among parliamentary "first movers," like twelfth-century Aragon (Møller, 2016) and thirteenth-century England (Boucoyannis, 2015) . More generally, Stasavage (2016, p. 155 ) finds a statistically significant relationship between warfare and parliamentary activity across pre-modern polities in Europe.
Existing evidence suggests that parliamentary institutions helped states gather more fiscal resources for war. For instance, the ability to borrow enabled pre-modern states to respond to time-sensitive military needs. Schultz and Weingast (1998) find that better access to sovereign credit gave parliamentary states in Europe a military edge over their absolutist counterparts. Similarly, Stasavage (2011, pp. 31-2) shows that city-states -often characterized by parliamentary representation -were the first European polities to issue long-term public debt, at relatively low interest rates (Stasavage, 2011 , p. 39). Stasavage (2011 attributes this advantage to the ability of parliamentarians in city-states to stay on top of public finances.
While early parliaments were relatively effective at raising new fiscal resources for warfare, they did not often possess sufficient institutional constraints to reduce its frequency. Pre-modern rulers -under absolutist and parliamentary regimes alike -had a strong incentive to seek glory and spoils through warfare. They were taught from a young age to focus their efforts on military affairs (Hoffman, 2015, pp. 24-5) . Importantly, such glory was non-divisible: to achieve it, rulers had to actually fight in battle and win (Hoffman, 2015, p. 28) . Although parliamentarians had control over taxation, the decision to go to war generally remained in the ruler's hands (e.g., Hale, 1985, p. 29) . Cox (2011) labels this problem "royal moral hazard in warfare."
In this regard, pre-modern parliamentary regimes were a type of "transitional" autocracy, bridging the gap between the absolutist model and the mature democracies of to-day (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002) . Although uniquely representative and accountable by historical standards (Stasavage, 2016, pp. 147-9) , early parliamentary regimes differed in important ways from modern democracies. Most contemporary definitions of democracy include open competition and contestation, the right to participate and vote in elections, and civil liberties (e.g., Lipset, 1959 , Dahl, 1973 , Jaggers and Gurr, 1995 , Vanhanen, 2000 .
Institutionalized practices of political competition, inclusive participation, and political rights are key attributes of modern democracy that pre-modern parliaments typically lacked. Such democratic practices may have helped mature contemporary democracies prevent the outbreak of war in ways that pre-modern parliamentary regimes could not.
Hypothesis
The discussion above yields two competing explanations for why some pre-modern European polities experienced a greater frequency of armed conflict than others. The first is that absolutist monarchies were more likely to go to war due to unfettered executive authority. According to this view, warfare was a "royal sport" brought about by the lack of formal constraints on the king's war-making powers.
The second explanation sees war participation not as the product of unfettered absolutism, but of the historical transformation toward more representative forms of government. According to this view, early parliamentary regimes should have experienced more armed conflict than absolutist monarchies, due to their greater ability to harness fiscal resources for war, but insufficient institutional constraints to prevent its outbreak.
This argument has a clear observable implication: H1: Interstate wars involving (and between) parliamentary regimes should have been more common in pre-modern Europe than interstate wars involving (and between) non-parliamentary regimes.
We will use this hypothesis to guide our empirical analysis ahead.
Data
To test the hypothesis that early parliamentary regimes were more war-prone, we construct a new database of interstate conflicts in pre-modern Europe that spans 600 years, from the establishment of the first medieval parliaments (Stasavage, 2010) to the advent of mass warfare, which fundamentally changed the international relations landscape (Onorato, Scheve and Stasavage, 2014) . Two primary components comprise our historical database: war participation, and political regime type.
Warfare
For data on pre-modern warfare, we draw on comprehensive military histories by Bradbury (2004) and Clodfelter (2002 To find the locations of land conflicts, which represent more than 90 percent of conflict events in our data, we used the geographic coordinates of the settlement or town nearest to each conflict site. For locations of naval encounters, we used an approximation based on the nearest coastal city or region, if more precise coordinates were not available.
1 Brecke (1999) is an alternative source for historical warfare data, spanning violent conflicts worldwide from 1400 onward. The main shortcoming of the Brecke data for our purposes is that the conflict details are relatively vague. For example, Brecke's entry number 1297 is "Emperor-Palatinate, 1618-20." Unlike Bradbury and Clodfelter (as we will describe ahead), Brecke does not provide specific information about the number of individual conflict events for this entry, conflict locations, or belligerents. 2 Bradbury categorizes each campaign as an individual conflict, but Clodfelter groups military campaigns as wars, each of which has an entry of several paragraphs describing specific details.
To identify which participating state acted as attacker and defender, we relied on Bradbury and Clodfelter. 3 These historical accounts identify conflict initiators with terms such "attacked," "invaded," "initiated," or "assaulted" for battles and "besieged" for sieges.
For example, according to Bradbury (2004, p. 165) , the Teutonic Knights "crossed and initiated battle despite having the smaller force. . . " Since the identity of the instigator was in some cases ambiguous, we coded both the "directed" and "undirected" occurrence of dyadic conflict (i.e., respective and irrespective of initiator), and analyze each separately.
Regime Type
To identify the full universe of polities and potential belligerents in pre-modern Europe, we used the historical atlases of McEvedy (1972 McEvedy ( , 1992 , which provide the names, territory, and borders of historical polities over time. 4 We geo-referenced the available maps for each century over 1200-1800, and generated data on changes in territorial holdings and the approximate start or end dates of polities that did not exist throughout the entire pre-modern era. Using the McEvedy atlases, we developed a list of 83 unique sovereign states in pre-modern Europe, 45 of which went to war at least once.
Following Stasavage (2010, p. 631) , we classified polities as parliamentary based on the presence of a representative assembly with control over taxation. To determine which states had parliamentary systems and when, we began with previously established samples of parliaments (Stasavage, 2010, p. 631) and supplemented these records with parliamentary meeting data from van Zanden, Buringh and Bosker (2012, app. S1), along with three further historical sources: Marongiu (1968) , Myers (1975), and Graves (2014) .
In total, we identified 22 parliamentary regimes across the full population of polities in 1200-1800. We analyze our database with two complimentary empirical strategies: (1) a traditional dyadic analysis of interstate conflict, and (2) temporal exponential random graph models (TERGM) that account for dyadic interdependence and the dynamics of multilateral, coalitional warfare (Hanneke, Fu and Xing, 2010, Leifeld and Cranmer, 2016) .
We adopt this dual-track approach for several reasons. First, a dyadic analysis is theoretically appropriate for the hypothesis at hand. Previous research on the structure of contemporary militarized interstate disputes and rivalries has shown these phenomena to be primarily bilateral (Wolford, 2015, Diehl and Wright, 2016) . For this reason, dyadic analysis has traditionally been -and still remains -the dominant approach for the empirical study of interstate conflict (Croco and Teo, 2005, Diehl and Wright, 2016) . This dominance extends, in particular, to previous research on the influence of political regime type on war (Dafoe, Oneal and Russett, 2013 , Gartzke and Weisiger, 2013 , Gibler and Braithwaite, 2013 , Colgan and Weeks, 2015 , Renshon and Spirling, 2015 .
Despite the methodological dominance of dyadic analysis, international relations scholarship is becoming increasingly cognizant of the fact that interstate conflicts vary in their degree of bilateralism, with some battles and wars more multilateral than others. In such cases, dyadic analysis may lead to inferential bias due to un-modeled spatial, temporal, or strategic interdependencies between polities (Poast, 2010) . Given these concerns, network analysis -and TERGM in particular -provides a useful alternative to a purely dyadic approach (Hanneke, Fu and Xing, 2010 , Krivitsky and Handcock, 2014 , Leifeld and Cranmer, 2016 . While still accounting for dyadic and actor-level factors such as regime type, network analysis allows for extra-dyadic or system-level features -such as the degree of multilateralism in the international system -to affect dyad outcomes.
Network analysis is not without limitations, of course. While it mitigates potential bias related to dyad interdependencies, other biases could emerge through shared but unmeasured characteristics of polities (i.e., latent homophily), or unmeasured common dynamics of the system (O'Malley, 2013) . Furthermore, efforts to formally account for temporal dependence in a dynamic network setting require a consistent number of polities across time periods -a requirement that does not extend to dyadic panel data anal-ysis. We address these issues by following industry-best practices in model specification (Gerber, Henry and Lubell, 2013, Cranmer, Heinrich and Desmarais, 2014) , and by maintaining a methodologically plural approach. If both the dyadic and TERGM methods yield similar results, then we can have greater confidence that the parliament-war relationship represents a genuine historical pattern and not a statistical aberration.
Descriptive Evidence
Our hypothesis ("pre-modern parliamentary regimes fought more frequently") holds if two conditions are true. First, conflict between two parliamentary regimes should have been more likely than conflict between two absolutist (non-parliamentary) regimes.
Second, conflict between one parliamentary and one non-parliamentary regime (mixed dyads) should have been more likely than conflict between two non-parliamentary regimes. The high level of conflict participation by parliamentary regimes is even more striking when one considers that such dyads were relatively uncommon in pre-modern Europe. Table 1 shows contingency tables for the relative distribution of parliamentary regimes in the dyadic data, and the relative conflict propensity of each dyad type. Although parliamentary-parliamentary dyads represented just 7 percent of all historical dyads, they accounted for 34 percent of all conflicts. At the opposite end of the political spectrum, absolutist dyads were by far the most common, representing 59 percent of all dyads, but the least prone to conflict, at 16 percent. Just over one-tenth of one percent of absolutist dyads experienced conflict in an average decade, compared to almost two percent of mutually parliamentary dyads -a 17-fold difference in conflict risk. Mixed dyads, in which one participant was parliamentary and the other was not, fell between these two extremes.
Global comparisons of dyads can be misleading, however, since parliamentary regimes were not uniformly distributed across Europe, and the high rate of joint conflict participation of such polities may simply reflect a lack of opportunity for faraway absolutist regimes to fight their parliamentary counterparts. Indeed, Figure 2 suggests that most parliamentary-parliamentary conflicts occurred in Western Europe, while other types of conflict dyads were more evenly distributed throughout the continent. To account for the logistical feasibility of dyadic conflict, we analyzed the subset of polities that shared a land or maritime border according to the historical atlases of McEvedy (1972 McEvedy ( , 1992 . The bottom two contingency tables in Table 1 reveal a similar pattern as before:
parliamentary-parliamentary dyads were both relatively uncommon (12 percent of the total) and relatively war-prone (34 percent of all conflicts). While only one-half of one percent of contiguous absolutist dyads experienced conflict in an average decade, nearly 5 percent of contiguous parliamentary dyads did the same.
The descriptive evidence indicates that the most politically representative dyads were the most warlike in pre-modern Europe, while the most politically unaccountable dyads were the most peaceful. Two parliamentary regimes were more likely to go to war with each other than mixed dyads, and the latter were more war-prone than absolutist dyads.
Although these summary statistics reveal a stark pattern in the historical data, regime type is not the only predictor of armed conflict, and a host of confounding factors -from prior conflict participation to unobserved dyadic characteristics and interdependencemay have driven the historical variation in conflict behavior. To account for such concerns, we now turn to a series of more rigorous empirical tests.
Statistical Models
Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, as a benchmark, we conduct a traditional dyadic analysis of interstate conflict. Second, we fit a series of TERGM models to account for dyadic interdependence, while controlling for higher-order network effects that influence conflict onset, like coalition warfare and delayed reciprocity.
Dyadic Analysis
To test our hypothesis in a dyadic setting, we use the following model specification:
war ijt takes the value of 1 if the first polity i in the dyad initiated a conflict against the second polity j in a given time period t, and 0 otherwise. 5 Our temporal units of analysis t are decades, unless otherwise indicated. parl it indicates whether side i (attacker) was a parliamentary regime at time t, parl jt indicates whether side j (defender) was parliamentary, and parl it parl jt is a multiplicative interactive term (i.e., "both parliamentary"). 6
X ijt is a matrix of time-variant dyadic covariates, including geographic contiguity and the relative physical size of the two polities. Geographic continuity helps proxy for the opportunity for conflict, while relative size helps proxy for power relations. (r i , r j ) are regional fixed effects, which control for time-invariant demographic, geographic, economic, and social features specific to each region. 7 We adjust for temporal dependence, f (t), by including -in separate models -(1) time fixed effects, (2) regional time trends, (3) a temporal spline, or (4) a cubed time term (Carter and Signorino, 2010) . These controls help account for common shocks to the international system over time (e.g., Black Death, military revolution) along with the evolution of international norms promoting peaceful dispute settlement. Finally, we account for dyad-specific errors ij , which we model using random effects, and i.i.d. errors u ijt . 8
5 Since some conflicts involved mixed alliances of parliamentary and absolutist regimes, we disaggregated all conflicts into individual dyads. For example, we treat a conflict between one absolutist state and a two-state parliamentary-absolutist alliance as three dyads -one absolutist-parliamentary dyad in conflict, one absolutist-absolutist dyad in conflict, and one absolutist-parliamentary dyad at peace. 6 To limit our analysis to the onset of new conflicts, rather than participation in protracted wars, we always drop dyads in continuous conflict after the first time period t in which the war occurred. 7 We include regional dummies for Eastern, Northern, Southern, and Western Europe, and -in Section 7 -Northern Africa and Western Asia according to the Statistical Division of the United Nations (1999) . 8 Due to the binary nature of our dependent variable, a fixed effects estimator would drop all dyads that never went to war, or in which regime type or other regressors were temporally stable over 1200-1800. Such a specification is not theoretically appropriate in our case, since (1) it bases its inferences on a small subset of the population of historical European polities, and (2) assumes that the dropped peaceful dyads avoided conflict due to some un-modeled idiosyncratic dyadic feature, while substantive independent variables like political regime type were irrelevant to explaining this lack of conflict (Beck and Katz, 2001 ).
Dyadic Results
The dyadic analysis confirms that parliamentary polities were most likely to experience conflict, particularly against each other. Table 2 summarizes the results of regression models based on Equation (1) at the dyad-decade level. The results for dyad-year data, reported in the appendix, are substantively the same (see Table A .6).
As is clear from Figure 3a , parliamentary-parliamentary dyads had the highest probability of conflict. For two such polities with a common border, the probability of dyadic conflict in an average decade was 0.025 (95% CI: 0.018, 0.034). 9 By contrast, the probability that two contiguous absolutist regimes went to war was ten times lower, at 0.0023 The likelihood of conflict was far smaller for non-contiguous polities -where war required a relatively costly and logistically challenging expeditionary campaign by at least one of the belligerents. Yet the rank ordering across dyad types was the same. The probability of conflict between two non-neighboring parliamentary polities was 0.004 (95% CI: 0.003, 0.006), ten times higher than for two non-contiguous absolutist polities.
Network Analysis
Although the traditional dyadic analysis establishes a useful benchmark, the assumption of dyadic independence may not adequately capture the multilateral nature of premodern European warfare, where conflicts often unfolded between coalitions of states (rather than between individual polities), and where war decisions were potentially interdependent across dyads. To account for this possibility, we now complement the dyadic analysis with a series of TERGM models (Hanneke, Fu and Xing, 2010) .
Rather than viewing each conflict as the outcome of an independent, dyad-level process, TERGMs assume that the probability of conflict between each pair of polities was conditional on broader, extra-dyadic patterns of warfare in the European state system. 9 The predicted probabilities are based on Model 5 of Table 2. At each time period, the combination of these dyadic conflicts represents a "network" of interstate warfare, and TERGMs treat this network as a single, multivariate dependent variable. Formally,
where the dependent variable, Y t , is the observed conflict network at time t. Y t is a N t × N t matrix, where N t is the number of polities at time t, and individual dyads y ijt = 1 if polity i initiated a conflict against j at time t, and y ijt = 0 otherwise. On the right-hand side, g() is a vector of network statistics for Y t and Y t−1 , θ is a vector of coefficients, and
TERGMs treat the observed network Y t as a single draw from a probability distribution of random networks. They enumerate this sample space of networks by conditioning on the observed features of Y t (e.g., number of polities, regime types, past conflicts), and estimate optimal θ parameters through maximum pseudo-likelihood. The θ estimates can be interpreted as the log-odds of a conflict between polities i and j, following a unit increase in each variable (e.g., regime change from absolutist to parliamentary).
To capture the generative process underlying the conflict network, we include in the g() vector the same polity-level and dyad-level covariates as before (i.e., regime type, border contiguity, geographic area), along with a series of higher-order network effects.
These include, for each t, the density of the network (i.e., number of "edges"), the number of states at peace ("isolates"), and the number of reciprocal dyads in the system. To account for the dynamics of coalitional warfare, we condition on the number of states initiating conflict against a single polity ("in-stars") at each t. Because some states account for a disproportionate share of conflict -not as a result of a single dyadic dispute, but as a characteristic of an expansionist, activist foreign policy -we also condition on the number of states initiating conflict against multiple targets ("out-stars") at each t.
We account for changes to the conflict network over time with two additional network statistics. The first is an autoregressive "memory" term, which indicates whether each conflict existed in the previous time period (Leifeld, Cranmer and Desmarais, 2015) . The second is delayed reciprocity, or the tendency of states to initiate conflict against states that attacked them in the previous time period. This model specification closely follows past applications of TERGMs to international conflict, particularly the model of economic sanctions (Cranmer, Heinrich and Desmarais, 2014) . In the Appendix, we provide a formal description of the structure of g().
Network Results
The TERGM results generally mirror those from the dyadic analysis. Table 3 reports the full set of estimated θ coefficients for the directed (Models 1-2) and undirected versions (Models 3-4) of the conflict network, the latter of which account for uncertainty about conflict initiation. Figure 3b reports the predicted probabilities of conflict for each type of dyad -absolutist, parliamentary, and mixed -based on the parameters of Model 2.
We evaluated model fit by examining the area under the receiver-operator characteristic curve (AUC), which can be interpreted as the probability that -for a randomly-selected pair of dyadic relationships, one conflictive and one peaceful -the model assigns a higher predicted probability to the dyad in conflict. Model 2 had a higher AUC than all others, with predictive accuracy of .97 in-sample and .89 out-of-sample. 10 In an average decade, the probability of conflict was highest for parliamentary dyads (.0025, 95%CI: .0024, .0030), and lowest for absolutist dyads (.001, 95%CI: .0009, .0014).
The primary difference from the earlier results is in the lower absolute magnitude of these predicted probabilities. While conflict was a rare event in both cases, it became even more uncommon after we accounted for dyadic interdependence. A second difference is in the relative propensity for conflict among mixed dyads: non-parliamentary polities attacked parliamentary ones at a slightly higher rate (.0022; 95% CI: .0020, .0025) than parliamentary polities attacked non-parliamentary ones (.0019; 95% CI: .0018, .0021). In the dyadic model, these relative propensities were essentially the same.
Several additional results emerge for the higher-order, structural network characteristics in Table 3 . First, many states opted out of interstate military competition entirely (positive isolates). While some states initiated more than one conflict in a decade (positive out-two-stars), relatively few initiated more than two (negative, insignificant out-three- 10 We evaluated out-of-sample predictive accuracy by training each TERGM model on data from 1200 to 1750, and using the 1760-1800 subsample as the test set. stars). Second, while moderately-sized coalitions were quite common in pre-modern Europe (positive in-two-stars), large coalitions were not (negative, insignificant in-threestars). Third, reciprocity drove much of the variation in conflict initation. The probability of an attack by i against j in a given decade increased substantially if j attacked i in the same (positive reciprocity) or previous time period (positive delayed reciprocity).
Robustness Checks
Our results indicate that pre-modern parliamentary regimes were much more likely to go to war than non-parliamentary ones, according to both the dyadic and TERGM methods. For robustness, we now look beyond our benchmark set of controls, and consider five other potential confounding factors: outlier dyads and polities, temporal heterogeneity, regional differences, uncertainty over the direction of conflict initiation, and regional trends. Wherever possible, we implement these robustness checks for both empirical strategies (i.e., dyadic and TERGM).
Outliers
One concern is that, since only 7 percent of dyads fall into the fully parliamentary category, one particular state or rivalry may be driving our results. A related concern is that some states account for a disproportionate share of conflicts.
For instance, one-third of all European conflicts between 1200 and 1800 involved France, 19 percent involved Austria (including the Holy Roman Empire), and 16 percent involved England. We accounted for this possibility in our TERGM models by conditioning the probability of dyadic conflict on "out-stars," or the frequency with which increased belligerents appeared in the system. Taking this one step further, Appendix Figures A.1c and A.1d show that the iterative exclusion of polities from the data does not significantly change our results. After we remove the most extreme cases, conflicts involving parliamentary polities were still more likely than conflicts between absolutist regimes.
1500-1800 Period
The statistical analyses so far have considered the full sample of interstate conflicts between 1200 and 1800. Yet there may have been systematic differences in the international geopolitical environment between the late medieval (1200-1500) and early modern eras (1500-1800). For example, the military revolution of the 1500s saw the widespread adoption of infantry tactics, firearms, and new methods of logistics and recruitment (Parker, 1996 , pp. 1-2). Gennaioli and Voth (2015) argue that this set of events changed the fiscal requirements of conflict participation, which may have differentially affected parliamentary and non-parliamentary regimes.
The various temporal controls in the dyadic analysis account for common shocks to the international system, including the sixteenth-century military revolution. To further account for this event, we replicate our analyses while restricting the data sample to the subperiod 1500-1800. Appendix Figure A .2 reproduces the simulations from Figure 3 for this subperiod. We report the full model results in Appendix Tables A.8 to A.9. Apart from differences in relative conflict propensities for mixed dyads in the TERGM analysis, the 1500-1800 results are consistent with those for the full sample: parliamentary dyads were significantly more likely to go to war with each other than absolutist dyads. Furthermore, the predicted probabilities of conflict among fully parliamentary dyads were larger for this subsample. This result is consistent with Gennaioli and Voth (2015) 's claim -the exclusion of a single polity or dyad requires that we also discard all other connections those polities may have with other members of the system, fundamentally altering the structure of the network.
that the fiscal requirements of warfare increased after 1500, disproportionately affecting parliamentary regimes. To ensure that the exclusion of such conflicts is not driving our results, we replicated the models in Table 2 with the full geographic sample of European and non-European conflicts. The results (summarized in Appendix Figure A. 3) are substantively the same as before: parliamentary regimes were more likely to go to war -against each other and overall -than non-parliamentary regimes.
Beyond Europe

Uncertainty about Conflict Initiation
Another set of robustness checks accounts for measurement error surrounding the directed nature of conflict dyads. If there is some uncertainty over which polity was responsible for conflict initiation, statistical analyses of directed data -where polity i attacks or does not attack j at time t -may be misleading. This directionality does not affect inferences about the relative conflict propensity of fully parliamentary or fully absolutist dyads, but it may be problematic with respect to the two mixed dyad types.
While we make no theoretical claims about whether parliamentary regimes attacked nonparliamentary ones at a higher rate than the other way around, we would expect that both dissimilar dyad types fought at a higher rate than fully absolutist dyads.
To help address this concern, we discarded measures of directionality altogether and ran a set of undirected TERGM models. The results, reported in Models 3 and 4 of Table 3 , are substantively the same as before. Parliamentary polities were significantly more likely to experience conflict in a given time period than non-parliamentary regimes, regardless of who shot the first arrow or fired the first round.
Regional Trends
Regional economic and demographic patterns may have affected the incentives of polities to go to war (e.g., Gartzke, 2007) . Regional economic growth, for example, may have sparked increases in local population density, which in turn influenced the relative scarcity of land and thus incentives to fight expansionist wars. In this regard, underlying regional trends, and not political regime types per se, may explain the relative warproneness of early parliamentary regimes.
The various temporal controls in the dyadic analysis account for common economic and demographic trends over time. Unfortunately, time series data on local economic development -or suitable proxies, like urbanization -are not systematically available for our historical sample of 80-plus polities. One tractable way to control for local economic and demographic patterns, however, is to include region-specific linear time trends and re-run the main specifications from Equation (1). To operationalize this approach, we interact decadal fixed effects with regional dummies for the four regions as described in Section 6. The results (reported in Appendix Table A .10) remain similar in magnitude and significance to the main estimates. Thus, our results about political regime type and historical warfare appear robust to regional economic and demographic trends.
Discussion
This paper has analyzed 600 years of conflict in pre-modern Europe, and found that parliamentary regimes were significantly more belligerent than absolutist ones. Although parliamentary regimes were relatively uncommon before 1800, they fought in a disproportionately high share of armed conflicts. Such patterns suggest that the contemporary democratic peace -which has characterized interstate conflict behavior since the nineteenth century -was a departure, rather than a continuation, of previous historical trends. Prior to 1800, more representative and accountable political regimes were more war-prone than regimes with unfettered executive authority.
We attribute this result to the political economy of warfare in pre-modern Europe.
The establishment of early parliamentary institutions enabled states to raise greater fiscal resources for war, but insufficient institutional constraints to reduce its frequency. Even if monarchs did view war as a "royal sport," the monarchs who could most afford to compete in this sport tended to share political power with representative assemblies.
Our primary goal has been to evaluate the relationship between political regime type and war participation during a historical era that most international relations research has overlooked. Yet the patterns we uncovered raise important new questions. How did parliamentary belligerence in the pre-modern era subsequently evolve into a durable peace? If (partial) political power-sharing was not enough to prevent armed conflict in early parliamentary regimes, then why are modern democratic states better able to resist the temptation to mobilize their latent military capacity for war? While a rigorous treatment of these questions lies outside the scope of the current paper, we conclude with several potential paths forward for future research on this topic.
One possibility -in line with Tilly (1992) , Bates (2010) , Fearon and Laitin (2014) , and
Morris (2014) -is that interstate military competition eventually created the conditions for domestic peace. Lacking fiscal resources and military capacity, absolutist regimes became less effective at maintaining domestic security, many eventually falling to revolution. The replacement of absolutist regimes with more representative and accountable post-revolutionary governments intensified interstate military competition. As the fiscal and military strength of parliamentary states grew, they may have fought more wars, but they also became better positioned to impose domestic security. Establishing parliaments was a way to co-opt domestic elites, enabling them to challenge a ruler's decisions without resorting to military means. As states improved their domestic security, and representative assemblies gained more power, the institutional mechanisms behind the contemporary democratic peace were finally able to emerge.
A second potential explanation is the advent of the mass army during the Napoleonic Wars (Posen, 1993, Onorato, Scheve and Stasavage, 2014) . Until the end of the eighteenth century, European states relied on small long-service armies, staffed disproportionately by foreign mercenaries and freelance professionals. The mass mobilization of civilians into the French Army in the early 1800s was an unprecedented military feat, facilitated in large part by another new development -nationalism. To help guarantee that new recruits arrived with enough skill and commitment to the cause, nineteenth-century states organized mass literacy campaigns, focused on imbuing civilians with shared identity and purpose (Aghion et al., 2014) . This development expanded the military capacity of European polities, but also made territorial conquest more difficult, as the recruits on the opposing side were now "citizens" of the territory they were defending, and were more likely to resist foreign occupation. The heightened costs of expansionist war may have deterred parliamentary aggressors from launching opportunistic military campaigns.
A related possibility is that universal suffrage -a defining feature of modern democratic regimes that was lacking in early parliaments -created new demands for domestic spending. Along with new fiscal requirements brought about by the advent of the mass army (e.g., education, healthcare), the extension of the franchise may have increased expectations for social spending, helping lay the foundation for modern European welfare states (Lindert, 2004, pp. 179-82) . These developments may have made it politically difficult to commit as high a share of the budget to military purposes as early parliamentary regimes. As a result, parliamentary regimes that expanded the franchise and became more democratic were no longer able to mobilize their greater fiscal capacity toward war, absent significant domestic support (Scheve and Stasavage, 2010) .
These different explanations are not mutually exclusive -it is possible that all of them (or none) may simultaneously be true. From the evidence that we presented here, however, one thing should be clear: the absence of war between more representative and accountable political regimes is a relatively new historical phenomenon. Ascertaining why this is the case, and what changed, should be a priority for future research. Table 2 Model 2, Table 3 Table 2 Model 2, Table 3 where parl it and parl jt indicate that the attacker and defender, respectively, had a parliamentary regime at t, and ln(area it ), ln(area jt ) are the logged areas of each state.
Dyad-level covariates include an indicator of identical regime type (1{parl it = parl jt }) to control for 'homophily', and the absolute difference in territorial size, |ln(area it ) − ln(area jt )|, as a rough proxy for relative power. We also include regional dummies (r i , r j ), and an indicator of geographic contiguity, w ijt , equal to 1 if the two states either shared a geographic border, or were located within 200km of each other.
Higher-order network statistics include the number of edges in the network at t (∑ ∀i,j y ijt ), the number of isolates (∑ i 1{∑ j y ijt = 0}), and the number of reciprocal dyads (∑ ∀i,j y ijt y jit ).
We also include the number of incoming and outgoing 2-stars (∑ ∀i,j ∑ ∀k ={i,j} y jkt y ikt , ∑ ∀i,j ∑ ∀k ={i,j} y kit y kit ) and 3-stars (∑ ∀i,j,k ∑ ∀h ={i,j,k} y jht y iht y kht , ∑ ∀i,j,k ∑ ∀h ={i,j,k} y hit y hit y hkt ).
Finally, we include an autoregressive 'memory' term (∑ ∀i,j y ijt y ijt−1 + (1 − y ijt )(1 − y ijt−1 ) ) and delayed reciprocity (∑ ∀i,j y ijt y jit−1 + y jit y ijt−1 ).
